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I. INTRODUCTION
Kim Yuracko’s paper, Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism:
Toward a More Complete Theory of Employment Discrimination Law,
offers an exploration of judicial reasoning in gender discrimination
cases.1 The paper claims that distinctions developed under Title VII
jurisprudence cannot be explained solely through a liberal paradigm.
Rather, analyzing the motivation of judges in reaching their decisions,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego. LL.M. 2000, Harvard
University; LL.B. 1998, Tel-Aviv University. I thank Professor Larry Alexander for
inviting me to the “Rights and Wrongs of Discrimination” symposium and for his
extensive and invaluable comments on early drafts.
1. Kim Yuracko, Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism: Toward a More
Complete Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857
(2006).
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primarily in those cases involving the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) exception and sex stereotyping, Yuracko detects a value driven,
rather than value neutral, adjudicative assessment of the employment in
question. She finds that a “more controversial and covert set of values”
operates in the background, rendering some claims of discrimination
successful while rejecting others.2 Yuracko consequently argues that
there is no way to understand the distinctions that have developed within
BFOQ and sex stereotyping cases through liberal models of equality.3
Instead, Yuracko finds that existing case law categories are more
accurately understood as shaped by perfectionist ideals, which inform
judges on good life pursuits and values, such as autonomy, and other
less worthy pursuits, such as the commodification of sex and sexual
expression.4
Yuracko offers an interesting perspective in analyzing Title VII
jurisprudence. The paper uncovers tensions in the case law and offers
excellent insights into the types of judgments that occur in a broad range
of antidiscrimination cases. Building on her previous work, Yuracko
continues to influence the field of antidiscrimination law and gender
equity theories.5 Her article helps explain the underlying normative
theories that currently shape the scope of antidiscrimination protection.
In the following sections, I offer a few reactions to Yuracko’s paper.
Most basically, I argue that Yuracko both under-describes the power of
existing liberal models and overstates the coherence of the alternative
theory, perfectionism, in explaining recent developments in antidiscrimination
law. I also claim that the regulation of sexuality should be understood
simultaneously as presenting a unique case of regulating social relations
and as merely one example of basic contradictions in contemporary legal
thought.
I make three observations on Yuracko’s thesis to explain these ideas.
First, in Part II, I argue that it is possible to explain the case law
distinctions between various categories of BFOQ claims within the
liberal model of antidiscrimination. Specifically, I turn to a more robust
analysis of the antisubordination paradigm than Yuracko describes in her
paper. I argue that we should consider the dangers of under-inclusion in
one sector as the result of structural inequalities across the workforce.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 858.
Id. at 866-67.
Id. at 867-71.
See KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, PERFECTIONISM AND CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST
VALUES (2003); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004); Kimberly A. Yuracko,
Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 167 (2004).
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Because of the need to take a more macro approach in addressing the
effects of discrimination on the market at large, I also argue that as a
matter of policy, the courts are often not best situated institutionally to
promote labor market gender equality. In particular, discrimination that
stems from disparate impact, which requires a macro understanding of
the current market, past wrongs, and the ongoing effects of social group
hierarchies, would benefit from a more active administrative agency
rather than a court-focused process. While Yuracko and many other
commentators equate antidiscrimination regulation with adjudication,6 I
argue that it is desirable to allow the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) a greater role than it currently plays in the
administration of antidiscrimination law.
Second, in Part III, I argue that although it is true that court decisions
on the regulation of sexuality are pervasively value driven, Yuracko’s
turn to perfectionist theories of human development oversimplifies the
range of values and motivations that are in play. Here my disagreement
with Yuracko is that I urge a more complex and historical look at the
forces that trigger the regulation of sexuality at work. While some
regulatory impulses toward desexualizing the workplace may be based
on ideas of good human life and noncommodification of intimate
relations, there is a range of competing sets of values that have also had
a pervasive effect on the regulation of sexuality. These include the
managerial values of control and hierarchy, which are generally aligned
with a Taylorist scientific management theory that understands sexual
expression by workers as a threat to management’s power over production.7
Furthermore, the regulation of sexuality must be understood in the
context of broader social struggles, where nonconformity with social
conventions is frequently configured as a threat to order and existing
class distinctions. I will further describe how this interplay between
perfectionist and Taylorist ideals of human production has ironically
created an alignment between judge-made decisions and voluntary
practices of firms, both eager to desexualize the workplace.

6. On the focus of rights litigation in the context of antidiscrimination policy, see
generally Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 405 (2006); Orly Lobel, Form and Substance in Labour Market Policies,
book chapter forthcoming in THE INTERSECTION OF RIGHTS AND REGULATION (Brownen
Morgan ed., Ashgate Press).
7. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2072-73 (2003).
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The unstable alliance between Taylorist and perfectionist values in the
regulation of sexual behavior in the labor market relates to other deep
tensions in our commitments to gender equality and, more generally, to
the promotion of liberal values. Consequently, Parts III and IV provide
somewhat conflicting observations. I argue that there is something unique
about the regulation of sexuality that invokes value driven judgments in
adjudication. At the same time, I explore how sexual regulation is
merely one symptom of basic difficulties in the implementation of
liberal rights in concrete cases. Because sex is deeply coded with social
meaning and sexuality is always about more than just titillation, I assert
that value judgments about the quality of human interaction are
inevitable in Title VII’s implementation. In Part IV, however, I argue
that the case of antidiscrimination is merely one salient example of the
ways in which liberalism in action—whether we are debating the scope
of free speech or associational rights, equal opportunity or access to
social services—is fraught with hard distinctions, competing commitments,
and inevitable contradictions.
II. SERVING SEX STRAIGHT-UP: BFOQ, THE COWORKER MODEL,
AND STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION
The defense of BFOQ is the most direct exception to Title VII’s
prohibition on discrimination in employment.8 Title VII allows employers
to explicitly disqualify certain classes of applicants when such exclusion
is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business.”9 The defense exists in Title VII in the context of gender,
national origin, and religion. A parallel defense also appears in the
context of age under the ADEA. Race is notably excluded from the
exception, expressing the legislature’s belief that race can never serve
as a legitimate classification that is essential to the operation of a
business. In the case law, several categories of permissible BFOQ defenses
have developed. The most notable categories are privacy and safety.
For example, courts have accepted a BFOQ exception for hospitals
hiring nurses on the basis of gender in order to accommodate the privacy
interests of patients.10 Similarly, some courts have recognized a BFOQ
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
10. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132-35 (3d Cir. 1996);
Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352-54 (D. Del 1978) aff’d,
591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that privacy interests of residents allowed a
nursing home to assign only female nursing aids to female residents). But see Spragg v.
Shore Care, 679 A.2d 685 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (refusing to grant BFOQ for
assignment of male home health aides to male patients only, despite female residents’
privacy interests).
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claim in the context of prison security, where the employer argued that
“[t]he employee’s very womanhood would thus directly undermine her
capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a correctional
counselor’s responsibility.”11 Even in these contexts, courts have been
split in their degree of acceptance of the privacy and security needs of
third parties which justify a BFOQ exception.12 Moreover, when the
safety interests pertain to the workers themselves, courts have generally
rejected a BFOQ defense as a paternalistic claim by employers. For
example, in International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Court
rejected an employer’s refusal to employ women except those who
proved their infertility where the job involved exposure to dangerous
toxins that could endanger fetuses.13 Safety considerations are strongest
when the safety objective pertains to third parties, while safety arguments
about protecting the discriminated worker herself are often rejected as
paternalism. For example, several courts have refused to recognize
paternalistic protection of women as a BFOQ gender discrimination defense
to preclude women from serving as prison guards.14 Thus, when the
targets of safety are third parties, courts have been more inclined to
recognize the exception than when safety is cited vis-à-vis the excluded
worker herself. For prison guards and health aides, providing security
and care to inmates and patients are essential job functions. In contrast,
in International Union the protection of the employee’s fertility and her
unborn fetus was not part of the essence of the job and therefore did not
fit into the BFOQ exceptions.15 All of these examples demonstrate that
even within the easier cases of BFOQ, there is much debate about what
circumstances qualify for the exception.
In addition to privacy and safety, a third generally accepted category
under BFOQ is that of authenticity. The EEOC guidelines evoke an
example of a theatre producer searching for a lead actress to play the
heroine.16 Under such circumstances, the role need not be open to

11. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (permitting a prison to hire
only men).
12. See supra note 10.
13. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
14. Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980); Bagley v. Watson, 579 F.
Supp. 1099, 1104-05 (D. Or. 1983). But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 33637 (1977) (finding a BFOQ exception for prison guards in inmate “contact” positions).
15. Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 203-04.
16. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2).
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men.17 Likewise, for the purposes of authentic appearance as an ethnic
restaurant, an owner of a sushi bar does not have to consider anyone who
is not Japanese for the position of a chef, even if there are other qualified
individuals who are as familiar with the art of sushi preparation.18 Even
the legislative history of Title VII is concerned with the culinary experiences
of the average American. In the legislative discussions preceding the
enactment of Title VII, participants stressed that the Act should not be
interpreted to prevent the exclusive hiring of Italian nationals for the
making of pizzas or French applicants for chef positions in French
restaurants.19 These examples should quite readily raise some red flags
about line drawing in the seemingly uncontroversial categories of BFOQ.
First, the very idea that we should care about preferences for authentic
artistic, dramatic, and culinary experiences seems to be value driven. Of
course, one could claim that these are customer preferences rather than
court preferences. Yet it is the court that assesses what type of
preferences can be endorsed as part of a firm’s marketing strategy. The
legislature, the EEOC guidelines, and courts have endorsed experiential
consumption as valuable, above and beyond the mere quality of the food
in question. In turn, they allow businesses to discriminate between job
applicants on the basis of these experiential consumption preferences.
Implicit in these discussions are choices about good life that include
culinary satisfaction, artistic forms, and most controversially, the privileged
value of cultural “preservation” and “genuine” ethnic production.
BFOQ scholarly commentary considers these three categories of
safety, privacy, and authenticity as relatively unproblematic compared to
other customer preferences. Nevertheless, the above examples show
how these categories have required value driven judgments when applying
the abstract exceptions to concrete facts. The most controversial
category, and the one that is of interest to Professor Yuracko, is that of
customer preferences for one sex or the other, not for privacy, safety, or
authenticity reasons, but rather because of aesthetic or affective reasons.
Courts have generally rejected this residual category of preferences.
Thus, gender and sexuality have not been accepted as essential to the
business of marketing nonsexual services such as food and transportation.20
Yuracko describes the exclusion of sexual titillation marketing from
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Employers May Hire on the Basis of Religion, Gender or National
Origin in Certain Circumstances, EMPLOYMENT LAW BITS, Nov. 11, 2005, http://bwlaw.
blogs.com/employment_law_bits/2005/11/index.html.
19. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2548-49 (1964), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3179-81 (1968).
20. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971);
Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).

904

LOBEL.PRE_PDF_PAGES.DOC

[VOL. 43: 899, 2006]

2/26/2007 1:07:39 PM

A Response to Kim Yuracko
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

accepted BFOQ categories as presenting a puzzle to liberal models of
equality.21 Puzzle indeed, but even within a liberal paradigm of equality,
we can understand what judges are doing by adopting a more macro
view of egalitarian justice. In significant ways, the rejection of
sexuality-based BFOQ presents a relatively easy case under liberal
theory. Allowing employers to argue a BFOQ defense when they are
using only women for sexual titillation of their clients would fit
precisely into the kind of behavior that coworker theory promises to
prevent. As Yuracko correctly acknowledges at the outset, within the
liberal paradigm, employers are prohibited from treating men and
women “who are in fact different, differently, if doing so will reinforce
traditional status hierarchies.”22 Yet Yuracko states:
It is difficult, however, to argue that courts’ prohibition on sex discrimination
by sex-plus businesses is required by some formal conception of sex-blind
equality. In a meaningful sense, plus-sex employers are treating female and male
applicants equally, subjecting both to the same set of hiring requirements. It is
simply the case that, depending upon whom the employer is trying to sexually
arouse, individuals of one sex or the other are likely to be deemed unqualified.23

I disagree with the characterization of the “plus-sex” requirements as
fitting squarely with a formal principle of sex-blind equality.24 Yuracko
seems to accept a dialectic of two possible solutions promoted by the
courts: desexualized workplaces and purely sexual business. “[C]ourts
force these businesses to abandon sexual titillation or alternatively adopt
a more pure sex focus.”25 In effect, the dialectic characterizes the fact
that women are hired for the sexual arousal of male clients in nonsexual
contexts as simply a coincidence. Yuracko fails to consider a third alternative
of more equal “plus-sex” businesses. Using perfectionism as her analytic
frame, Yuracko accepts the problematic aspects of plus-sex business
without advancing a counter vision of a fully integrated workforce in
which sexual titillation would be equally performed. I argue that a
structural lens of occupational segregation provides a better analytic
framework for analyzing the context of sexual marketing strategies. The
law’s concern about sex segregation—where women occupy sexy or
21. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 872-74.
22. Id. at 859.
23. Id. at 874.
24. I borrow the term plus-sex from Yuracko, referring to businesses that sell sex
along with other goods and services. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies:
Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, supra note 5.
25. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 874.
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pink collar jobs, while men occupy higher-paid business world jobs—
has guided courts to largely reject BFOQ claims in the category of
sexual marketing.
Consider a non-hierarchical gender equality world in which the
consumption of sexy dressing is equally distributed. In such a world,
airlines, restaurants, hotel lobbies, and law firm reception halls would all
include both men and women in skimpy sexy outfits to the enjoyment of
diversely oriented clients. Implicit in the rejection of women having the
occupational quality of attracting business people to a particular airline
is that if one could envision a gender egalitarian world, both women and
men would have the purchasing power to trigger the marketing strategies
of high-end consumption. In the absence of gender hierarchy in social
and economic relations—in a universe in which the consumption of sexy
dressing were equally distributed—I predict that courts would have far
less interest in scrutinizing businesses like Hooters when they claim
BFOQ.26 By contrast, in reality courts categorize sexual marketing as
licensing gender selective hiring because of deep insights into how
gender and sexuality practically interact in our contemporary landscape
to produce inequality. Sexuality is not intrinsically threatening to
workplace production, but rather it is the combination of unequal power
and sexualization that produces discriminatory environments. This
combination is salient in the world of air travel. When Pan Am presented
empirical evidence that its customers preferred young female flight
attendants, the court rejected this as establishing BFOQ.27 Women
serving up sex as flight attendants reinforce a structure where men are
assumed to have the higher-paid, higher-valued jobs of the business
world traveler. A major weakness in Yuracko’s argument is her all-tooquick rejection of the coworker model in analyzing BFOQ distinctions:
Courts’ prohibition on discrimination in these plus-sex cases is also difficult to
explain by relying on a standard coworker principle. Given the far greater demand
for commodification and sale of female sexuality than male sexuality, allowing
employers to define businesses as including explicit sexual titillation elements
would, in all likelihood, lead to a wide range of jobs from which men but not women
are excluded. In other words, from a pure numbers perspective, the sexualization of
mainstream jobs is likely to help rather than hurt women’s job prospects.28

26. Miranda McGowan usefully pointed out that, in our current social environment,
even when a small fraction of businesses cater to women customers in offering sexualized
men, these enterprises, like Chippendales, receive a very different meaning in our contemporary
culture than the male-oriented majority enterprises. They are construed and understood
as parodies or caricatures—unreal micro-performances imitating, without pretending to
be, the real thing. This is because everyone involved in the counter performance of
sexual marketing understands that it is situated in a pervasive reverse reality world.
27. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
28. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 874-75.
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Here is the heart of the limitation in Yuracko’s analysis. Yuracko
neglects the danger of being disproportionately included in a particular
position, not disproportionately excluded. Again, without a macro view
of job distribution in the labor market, it is easy to underplay the
meaning of the micro facts of one airline’s marketing strategy. In
particular, Yuracko’s analysis collapses the various market perspectives,
failing to account for the triangle of employer-employee-customer.
Whose human flourishing are the judges advancing or not advancing
when they accommodate customer preferences over an employee’s
identity? Part of the confusion stems from the fact that Yuracko adopts
the customer’s perspective when explaining the cases of privacy and
autonomy, while taking the perspective of the worker in the case of
sexual arousal or titillation.
In an important way, the questions posed to the court by
antidiscrimination claims are always about choice and autonomy. When
one side in a private economic relationship demonstrates an identitybased preference and another contests that preference, the court is
authorized to adjudicate between these competing perspectives. This is
further complicated when there are three sides claiming a position on
discriminatory preferences. The employee-employer dichotomy shifts to
a triangular set of interests, and the question becomes: Whose
preferences is the firm privileging—those of its workers, or of its
customers? One of the indicators of a phenomenon worth protecting
must be its robustness and its connections to other aspects of the labor
market. Today, numerous marketing strategies potentially fall into the
plus-sex category.29 The flip side of catering to the expectations of
customers is the signaling effect to the market that business men are the
preferred customers that make the world go round. If men fly around the
world as occupiers of the higher paid, higher valued business world jobs,
then women are those that occupy the role of the sexual flight attendant.
My contention is that if these marketing strategies were not limited to
the provision of female sexuality to male customers, the positions would
become generally more valued. However, under current labor market
conditions, where the market is sexualized and segregated, sexual
preferences are not the same as privacy preferences by customers. This
is because it is possible to make a claim for privacy in non-hierarchal
29. See, e.g., Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible
Sex Discrimination, supra note 5, at 173-75.
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ways so that workers from both gender groups can be assigned each to
their own gender while claims about sexual preferences by high- end
male customers are likely to reinforce gender hierarchy. A thicker
understanding of the coworker model that takes a broader distributive
justice approach fits well with liberal theory. Put simply, the goal of
employment discrimination policies is to promote women’s equality in
the workforce, not in a particular sector or job. Therefore, the cases of
sexualizing non-sex work positions fit the coworker paradigm well.
There is no need to turn to theories of perfectionism in order to explain
why capabilities and choices are confined when women’s work is
segregated to sexual and pink collar positions and tasks.
Finally, it should be emphasized that courts have understood the risk
of job segregation through gendered requirements not only in the context
of sexual requirements but also in other gender codes. For example, in a
case that is not mentioned in Yuracko’s article, the court found gender
discrimination at a hospital where women technicians were asked to
wear uniforms that would associate them with nurses, while men were
given uniforms that would associate them with doctors.30 Upholding the
lower court decision striking down sex-specific dress codes for hospital
technicians, the court stated that the dress requirements “were
intentionally designed to reinforce sexual stereotypes: men were dressed
to look like doctors, and women were dressed to look like nurses.”31
Requiring women technicians to wear this specific uniform “implied
they were of lower status than the male lab technicians[,] increas[ing]
the psychological burden on the females.”32 While the case did not
involve sexy dressing, it involved color-coded sexed dressing. The
analysis would not be complete without the immediate understanding
that doctors and nurses are not equally regarded in the contemporary
labor market. Rather, there is social meaning encoded in the sex-based
attire and grooming that corresponds to widespread occupational inequality.
A liberal judge must understand the use of sexual codes as proxies for
job segregation, prestige, and power whether the codes are sexy
dressing, femininity, or makeup requirements. Ironically, the judicial
understanding that part of Hooters’ essence was to sell sexuality has
recently proven to be a double-edged sword. In a different context than
Title VII, Hooters lost an intellectual property trade dress infringement
claim in HI Limited Partnership (Hooters) v. Winghouse.33 The Eleventh
Circuit upheld the Florida trial court’s decision that the “Hooters Girl” is
30. Dep’t of Civil Rights v. Edward W. Sparrow Hosp. Ass’n, 377 N.W.2d 755,
757, 764 (Mich. 1985).
31. Id. at 764.
32. Id. at 757.
33. 451 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2006).
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“the very essence of Hooters’ business,” whose “predominant function is
to provide vicarious sexual recreation, to titillate, entice, and arouse
male customers’ fantasies.”34 Therefore, the court deemed the skimpy
Hooters outfit “primarily functional” and not subject to trademark
protection.35 Even though the court recognized that the tank tops and
running shorts of Hooters waitresses were distinctive enough to raise a
trade dress claim under the Lanham Act, the outfit was not primarily
nonfunctional. Since the court understood the function of Hooters to be
sexual titillation, it would not grant Hooters the competitive advantage
of prohibiting other businesses from similarly adopting a sexual
approach to the sale of hamburgers and hot wings.
Gender stereotyping is yet another example that can be analyzed in the
context of coworker. Here, Yuracko’s discussion of the PriceWaterhouse
decision is more sensitive to the richness of the antidiscrimination
analysis. She recognizes that “[i]n a sexist society, nothing done by men
and women has precisely the same meaning. Traits are not understood
or viewed as isolated technical attributes. They are necessarily viewed
in relation to all of the other traits an individual possesses and through a
systematically gendered lens.”36 But in the context of sex stereotyping,
Yuracko’s reading of courts’ reasoning is too benign. She describes
courts as valuing high paying, high status jobs that require rational
reasoning and intellectual efforts, stereotypically masculine characteristics.
Yuracko explores the story of Ann Hopkins, the plaintiff that was denied
partnership at accounting firm PriceWaterhouse on the basis that she was
too aggressive and not ladylike.37 Hopkins was often praised as “an
outstanding professional” with a “strong character, independence, and
integrity . . . extremely competent, intelligent, strong and forthright, very
productive, energetic and creative.”38 Yet she was also “overly aggressive,
unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff.”39

34. HI Ltd. P’ship v. Winghouse of Fla., Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258-59 (M.D.
Fla. 2004); see also Posting of Ann Friedman to Feministing.com, http://feministing.
com/archives/005278.html (June 25, 2006, 20:01 EST) (describing the decision as “[t]he
11th Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirms a ruling that waitresses in tank tops and tiny
track shorts are actual products, not symbols that can be trademarked.”).
35. HI Ltd. P’ship, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 1258-59.
36. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 889.
37. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231-35 (1989).
38. Id. at 234.
39. Id. at 235.
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Although Yuracko acknowledges the problematic aspects of individual
stereotyping that require compliance with an identity group, I believe it
is also useful to connect PriceWaterhouse with broader recent developments
in the nature of work itself. Again, a more macro and structural orientation
of employment patterns and occupational inequalities is necessary.
Particularly in newer industries, where production is more relational than
individuated, employers seek workers that can comply with “soft skill”
requirements and engage in “emotional labor.”40 Arlie Hochschild defines
emotional labor as work that “requires one to induce or suppress feeling
in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper
state of mind in others . . . .”41 Interpersonal skills include friendliness,
teamwork, sociability, likeability, and the ability to fit in. Soft skills also
include motivational signals such as “enthusiasm, creativity, positive work
attitude, morale, commitment, dependability, and willingness to learn.”42
All of these qualities demand from workers appropriate affect, grooming,
and attire. Importantly, even in the most prestigious professional positions,
emotional work is disproportionately delegated and expected of women.
Therefore, in sex-stereotyping cases, similarly to BFOQ cases, the
coding of feminine traits as part of work requirements are often held as
disparate treatment prohibited by Title VII. Indeed, I would suggest that
the perfectionist ideals that Yuracko describes are themselves sexualized.
Ideas such as rationality, objectivity, and reason, contrasted with irrationality,
subjectivity, and emotionality, have been aligned with male/female values
and, in turn, receive a hierarchical inscription in legal doctrine. The
commodification of certain behaviors and emotions and the exclusion of
others, where gender is scripted and coded, reveals the discursive nature
of sexuality. Employee and customer preferences are themselves directed
and reinforced by legal categories. Thus, BFOQ and sex stereotyping
cases can reinforce or eradicate preferences, according to the boundaries
they draw between permitted and prohibited classifications. Again, this
reveals basic tensions that underlie the type of jurisprudence that
Yuracko attempts to organize in a rather neat rubric of perfectionist
decisionmaking.
As a final comment, I suggest that the difficulties in delineating the
BFOQ exceptions and the stereotyping contexts to prohibited discrimination
underscore the general challenges of adjudicating equal opportunity
40. See Orly Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations:
Four Dimensions of Power in Shifting Patterns of Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121,
166-67 (2001).
41. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART 7 (1983).
42. Lobel, supra note 40, at 178 (citing Philip Moss & Chriss Tilly, “Soft” Skills
and Race: An Investigation of Black Men’s Employment Problems, 23 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 251, 256 (1996)).
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rights in the workplace without a more active administrative scheme.43 I
have shown elsewhere that the recent developments in the organization
of work and production require a change in the ways we approach
employment regulation.44 Here, I believe the dilemmas Yuracko highlights
in her paper again support a reform that would expand the regulatory
tools and strategies for effective workplace policy reforms. In particular,
Yuracko’s exploration of adjudicative puzzles suggests the importance
of enhancing the EEOC’s role in enforcing Title VII.
While the first decades of antidiscrimination litigation involved some
of the most intentional and overt cases of discrimination, current forms
of inequality are often more subtle and complex. “As the workplace has
become more dynamic and multifaceted, discriminatory practices are
frequently not the result of a distinct and direct decision to discriminate
but rather of complex practices, including corporate culture, informal
norms, networking, training, mentoring, and evaluation.”45 These more
subtle forms of gender discrimination simply require more than litigation
and the declaration of a victim or perpetrator. Rather, they require
problem-solving efforts that engage employers and workers in ongoing,
reflexive efforts to learn about the barriers of gender equity in the
workplace. Often, discrimination is the consequence of intragroup
“horizontal” dynamics, rather than top-down managerial direction:46
A governance approach to discrimination thus changes the understanding of the
nature and sources of discrimination. Rather than seeing the worker as the victim
and the employer as the conscious, malicious villain, it understands that
discrimination is frequently the consequence of processes and structures that
can be transformed through learning and mutual engagement.47

The difficulty in discerning the coworker effects from other market
practices reveals the limits of Title VII litigation, which delineates
business practices as either allowed or prohibited—an on-off tool based
on the configuration of clear lines between discriminators and the
43. For arguments about the limitations of rights claiming absent a more
developed regulatory framework, see generally Orly Lobel, Form and Substance in
Labour Market Policies, supra note 6.
44. See Orly Lobel, Orchestrated Experimentalism in the Regulation of Work, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2146 (2003).
45. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 420 (2004) (citing
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 469 (2001)).
46. See Lobel, supra note 40, at 173-74.
47. Lobel, supra note 45, at 421.
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victims of discrimination. In recent years, many commentators have
pointed out the limits of Title VII in changing the realities of gender
discrimination in the contemporary workplace.48 Because they are
entrusted with merely one case at a time, courts are necessarily limited in
their perspective of workplace justice. In any given case, they are observing
a single workplace rather than a sector at large, regional production
patterns, or developments across industries. In order to understand the
market effects of segregated jobs, courts must analyze not only the
particular workplace before them, but also information about the
composition of clients, statistical changes in the workforce at large, and
the comparative conditions of employees in various positions in the
industry. In short, courts need to take a broad view of the market in
order to understand patterns of gender subordination.
A richer, more nuanced understanding of the causes and effects of
discrimination fits well with a more active role for the EEOC. This is
particularly true in light of private market efforts in “diversity
management.”49 Increasingly, firms are adopting internal compliance
structures to promote diversity in the workplace, including codes of ethics,
focus groups, internal grievance procedures, and training programs.50 I
have been a cautiously optimistic commentator on the move away from
a sole focus on “command-and-control” to an increased focus on ex ante
cooperative prevention, mandated corporate self-regulation, and “beyond
compliance” programs.51 But the caution remains simple: All compliance
programs are not created equal and voluntary programs can never be the
only means of preventing illegal behavior in complex organizations.
The key is to distinguish between effective approaches that support the
goals of the policies and those approaches that are merely cosmetic—an
48. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006); Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and
Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 2370 (1994); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 396 (2005); Lobel, supra note 45, at 419-23;
Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 610-14 (2001);
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001).
49. Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity
Management: Employer Response to Anti-Discrimination Law 1961-1996, 41 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 960, 964-66 (1998).
50. Id.; see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute
for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and
Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3
(2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s limitation of liability for employers who utilize
antidiscrimination training).
51. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89
MINN. L. REV. 498, 507-08 (2004).
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evasion or a liability shield by means of symbolic attention.52 Yet the
EEOC has not been significantly involved in the design or evaluation of
these programs. The EEOC has only recently adopted policies that
promote ongoing communication among advocacy groups, community
organizations, industry representatives, and worker representatives.53 By
and large, the agency has not studied the effects of voluntary industry
programs and remains generally passive in its practices.
Unlike other administrative agencies, the EEOC was set up as a weak
regulatory agency that lacks rulemaking power. Rather than promulgate
rules, the agency issues nonbinding guidelines, conducts investigations,
and impacts litigation. Consequently, EEOC guidelines are afforded less
deference than the rules issued by other federal agencies.54 Taking a
comparative perspective from across the Atlantic, this is a fairly limited
role for the agency entrusted with the task of the promotion of workplace
equality. For instance, unlike the American EEOC, the British Equal
Opportunities Commission has both investigative and rulemaking
powers.55 It also received greater administrative enforcement powers
and is designed to study the market, collect information, and promote
industry-wide change.56 Unlike courts that are best situated for the
correction of past wrongs in individual cases, agencies are better situated
to take a broader approach of distributive justice and future change.
Understanding the complex ways discrimination operates supports this
broader approach to law and social change and points to the advantage
of a legal process, rather than a merely court-oriented perspective.57

52. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003).
53. See Sturm, supra note 48, at 552-53 & n.345; see also Lobel, supra note 45, at
422-23.
54. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1937 (2006) (“In the area of federal antidiscrimination law, the
U.S. Supreme Court often prefers to ‘chart its own course’ rather than to defer to Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission . . . regulations and guidance interpreting these
laws.”).
55. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, c. 65, § 67 (Eng.); see also Julie Chi-hye Suk,
Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 447.
56. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, § 67; see also Suk, supra note 55.
57. For further discussion, see generally Orly Lobel, Form and Substance in
Labour Market Policies, supra note 6.
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III. REGULATION OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE PRIVATE MARKET
Having argued that much of the puzzle of BFOQ and stereotyping
categories in Title VII cases can be settled by using the lens of liberal
theories of equality, I now turn to examine other sets of values that are in
play in Title VII adjudication. Here, I agree with Yuracko’s claim that
gender equality concerns are not all that feeds into the adjudicative
process.58 Yuracko focuses on the regulation of sexual behavior in the
workplace as it unfolds in subcategories of antidiscrimination litigation.
However, the regulation of workplace sexuality extends far beyond these
cases to a wide array of social facts and legal doctrine. These contexts
include workplace harassment, workplace dating policies, employee
privacy and autonomy, speech and political activity, and even contexts
outside of the workplace such as explaining consent in sexual relations.
Together these contexts present a map of sex jurisprudence as a unique
affair in our society. Sex is pervasively institutionalized through regulation
and, in turn, the regulation of sexual behavior profoundly affects the ways
we understand sexual behaviors, sexual taboos, and sexual meaning.59
Situating the question of Title VII litigation in this broader scheme of
sexuality at work, it becomes clear that the law simultaneously prohibits
and allows the eroticization of the workplace. The regulation of sexuality
therefore presents a unique context of social behavior codification as law
and power intertwine.
Yuracko finds perfectionist ideals to be the driving force behind many
of the legal impulses to restrict sexuality at work.60 I suggest a far more
complex, and often less benign, description of the non-commodification
impulse of judges. I urge an analysis that includes the ways sexuality
has been historically configured as a threat to private market production.
Even though Yuracko describes cases where employers develop
requirements to induce sexuality in commercial contexts,61 sexuality at
work is frequently understood as a threat to order. As Yuracko describes,
plus-sex commerce can be a money-making endeavor.62 But industry
also frequently treats sexuality in the workplace as a money-losing
combination.63 The perception of sexuality as a threat to market production
58. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 862.
59. For a provocative inquiry on how legal fields, including First Amendment,
broadcast regulation, sexual harassment, and education law interact with cultural taboos
pertaining to the use of sexual terms, see Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, Center for
Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 59 (2006).
60. Yuracko, supra note 1, at 874.
61. Id. at 872-80.
62. Id. at 873.
63. Id. at 880-83.
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has led to strange alliances between feminist theorists, puritanical ideologists,
and managerial capitalists.
Noticeably, there has been far greater public acceptance of the
regulation of sexual behavior than of other aspects of the workplace.
For example, sexual harassment is a far more studied and discussed topic
than occupational risk regulation.64 Human resource administrators,
managers, and in-house counsel are all too enthusiastic in jumping on the
wagon of desexualizing the workplace. Indeed, there is a long history of
private (and more recently, public) regulation of sexual conduct in industrial
relations. The idea that sexuality in the workplace should be contained,
controlled, and to the extent possible, eliminated, does not simply fit
certain perfectionist ideals but also fits neatly with modern managerial
schools of thought. When judges reject a sexualized workplace, they are
occasionally passing judgment on the ways in which cognitive labor is
better than manual labor. Yuracko correctly reads some decisions as
motivated by the idea that a rational, intellectual being has a better life
than a sexual or physical being.65 Surely, it is possible that some of the
cases discussed by Yuracko would be endorsed by leading perfectionist
theorists such as Thomas Hurka, George Sher, Martha Nussbaum, and
Peggy Radin.66 But interestingly, the model of separating sexuality from
industrial production also fits well with Frederick Taylor, Henry Ford,
and a line of contemporary management theorists.67 Strikingly, from a
market perspective, a majority of businesses still understand sexuality as a
threat.68 Like in other spheres of life, sex in the marketplace presents
dangers. Intimacy and sexual expression at work are understood to threaten
productivity and reduce efficiency. In particular, female sexuality and any
form of deviant sexuality risks chaos and the unleashing of resistance
and non-submissiveness.69
Examples of corporate regulation of sexuality and intimacy include
restrictions on dating,70 dress and grooming requirements,71 and intense
64. See Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The
Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1128 (2005), for a discussion
of the thinness of public debates in the context of occupational safety.
65. Id. at 880.
66. Id. at 864-66.
67. See Lobel, supra note 40, at 144-45; Schultz, supra note 7, at 2064.
68. Schultz, supra note 7, at 2090-92.
69. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley
trans., Pantheon Books 1978) (1976); ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF
THE CORPORATION (2d ed. 1993).
70. Talley v. Wash. Inventory Serv., 37 F.3d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1994) (dismissing
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monitoring of “proper” sexual interaction, revealed through the mushrooming
of sexual harassment training programs.72 Corporate headquarters have
been curiously enthusiastic about implementing sexual harassment training
programs, exhibiting a fetish-like eagerness to resolve sex tensions
through an hour long catch-all session on how not to behave. In fact,
businesses have gone above and beyond what courts have actually defined
as sexual harassment.73 Employee handbooks, company manuals, and
sexual harassment training frequently prohibit behavior that would not
be considered sexual harassment, such as interacting with a coworker in
social contexts, commenting on a new blouse, or hugging a colleague.
One popular commercial PowerPoint template designed for corporate
sexual harassment training gives the example of a man and a woman
dining.74 The manual explains that even though inviting a woman supervisee
or coworker to share a meal “is not harassment[,] . . . it’s still not a good
idea.”75 Courts, legislators and administrators have been equally enthusiastic
about these programs. In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has
used discrimination training and internal compliance procedures as an
employer’s defense against sexual harassment claims.76 Antidiscrimination
training by corporate headquarters has also been recognized as a way of
reducing damages and reaching settlements in existing cases.77 Even
more recently, the state of California passed a law that every workplace
with fifty or more employees must provide two hours of sexual harassment
training and education to all supervisory employees at least once every

a wrongful termination claim of an employee dating, and subsequently marrying, a
coworker); Rulon-Miller v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 251 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding wrongful termination in the dismissal of an employee for dating an
employee of a competitor); Roberto Ceinceros, Some Employers Using Contracts to Cut
Romance Risks, 32 BUS. INS. 3 (1998), available at http://www.businessinsurance.com/
(subscriber only) (discussing use of “love contracts” to help companies thwart sexual
harassment lawsuits); Mark Hansen, Love’s Labor Laws: Novel Ways to Deal with Office
Romance After the Thrill Is Gone, 84 A.B.A.J. 78, 79 (1998) (describing how
corporations are adopting policies on dating and encouraging dating employees to sign
“consensual relationship agreements”).
71. See Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992); Mary Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A
Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 73 (1982).
72. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable
Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 154-55 (2001).
73. See Schultz, supra note 7, at 2064.
74. BUSINESS AND LEGAL REPORTS, INC., CALIFORNIA GUIDE TO PREVENTING
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 14.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
77. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 50, at 3.
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two years.78 In turn, the multibillion dollar industry of practitioners
providing compliance training is flourishing, marketing audio, video,
computer, or Web-based training and seminars.79
These developments in fact fit well with the series of cases of sex
stereotyping and sexual titillation that Yuracko identifies in her paper. If
corporations can control the grooming and dress codes of their employees,
gender norms continue to be shaped by unequal social and market
relations. Moreover, the focus on the regulation of sexuality arguably
diverts attention and resources from other issues of workplace justice.
In other words, the “sexiness” of the topic of sexuality overshadows
other questions of fairness and justice. Vicki Schultz has been a leading
commentator on the ways the focus on regulating sexual conduct at work
has been at odds with the broader project of occupational gender equity.
In her article, The Sanitized Workplace, Schultz argues that “the attempt
to banish sexuality from the workplace threatens many important social
interests.”80 Schultz argues that a feminist discourse has been subsumed
by the neo-Taylorist project of regulating sexuality in the workplace.
Human resource managers eagerly suppress any indication of sexual
energy and intimacy in their ranks:
It wasn’t Victorian churchwomen, but twentieth-century organization men who
took the lead in creating the asexual imperative: men like Frederick Winslow
Taylor, who saw managers as rational “heads” who would control the unruly
“hands” and irrational “hearts” of those who assumed their places as workers in
the modern organization. Although the necessity of bureaucratic organization
has come under challenge in recent years, the drive toward asexuality is not
fading along with it. Today, as much as ever, sexuality is seen as something
“bad”—or at least beyond the bounds of professionalism—that should be
banished from organizational life. If sexuality cannot be banished entirely, then
those who embody or display it must be brought under tight control and
subjected to discipline.81

While Schultz envisions an integrated workplace benefiting from
liberating sexual expressions, she also recognizes that in the context of
job segregation sexual expression assumes a different social meaning.
In a sex segregated market, all supervisors are men and all supervisees
are women, or, as in our previous discussion, all high-end business
78. California Fair Employment and Housing Commission, Modified Proposed
Regulations on Harassment Training and Education, http://www.fehc.ca.gov/pdf/
modified_6-20-06.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
79. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 50, at 16.
80. Schultz, supra note 7, at 2067.
81. Id. at 2064.
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customers are men and low-end service workers are women. Rather
than simply supporting non-commodification of the ideals of love and
sex, in a segregated labor market sexual regulation becomes one, but not
the only, expression of gender subordination.
Most disturbingly, the focus on sexual behavior as the dominant form
of gender discrimination has stunted a more robust idea of workplace
justice. De-sexing the workplace allows employers control over various
aspects of work and at the same time leaves intact other forms of less
explicit gender hierarchy in the workplace. As in former eras,
contemporary culture has internalized the idea that sexuality does not fit
well with the public sphere. In turn, active separation between private
and public aspects of workers contributes to the idea of separation
between spheres, such as the private essence of childrearing.82 The
creation of public/private distinctions in relation to care work, paid, and
unpaid work remain the background legal rules, exacerbating the
conditions of gender hierarchy in workplace without a direct or salient
intervention in contractual relations. It is thus easier, or in a way safer,
for private industry as well as for courts, to identify discrimination in
sexually explicit activities, because this focus narrows the field of
inquiry. It excludes deeper inquiries on distributive justice, pay equity,
family responsibility rights, and firm decisionmaking structures. Again,
this also reveals the limitations of turning to courts for antidiscrimination
workplace reform. The anomaly of Title VII and identity based claims
as the primary focus of workplace advocacy should be questioned when
contrasted with a comprehensive vision of workplace equity. Currently,
so much of the discourse on distributive justice is funneled into claims
about workplace discrimination that discussions of workplace reform are
exceedingly narrow.83 It is a classic example of a statute that expected
to do too much, and in turn achieves too little.
Finally, my arguments about sexual regulation relate to the question of
egalitarian reform in the face of pervasive inequities. The fact that there
are multiple values that affect the regulation of sexuality in the
workplace offers an opportunity for a women’s agency to construct the
meanings of sexuality in non-egalitarian environments. When there is
enough play in the social meanings of enhancing or suppressing
sexuality at work, “[a] single item of clothing might evoke any of these
or countless other narratives, each suggesting further plot details: the

82. Frances E. Olsen,The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
83. See Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 155152 (2006).
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deflowered virgin, the aroused sex slave, the dominatrix.”84 One of the
greatest challenges for feminist legal theorists has been to articulate a
theory of female agency in the face of pervasive male dominance.
Feminist theorists like Mary Jo Frug, Kathryn Abrams, and Judith Butler
have argued that patriarchy constructs both male and female sexuality
from a particular male-oriented perspective, so that both men and
women experience sexuality through male domination.85 For example,
dress codes that require men to wear a tuxedo and women to wear small,
sexy dresses perpetuate patriarchal ideas of gender roles and hierarchy.
Sexuality, as has been discussed in the preceding Parts, becomes a
pervasive form of discipline.86 Sexy dressing requirements become a
script which encodes the norms of our society, and female sexy dressing
requirements signify “the eroticization of domination.”87
If patriarchy is a pervasive reality for all, it is inevitable that women
internalize male aesthetics and gender-coded norms. This has led some
commentators to an impasse. Duncan Kennedy has described the
“conventional view” that understands sexy dressing as the trigger for
sexual abuse (“the woman asked for it”) and the “radical feminist view”
that understands sexual subordination as the cause for sexy dressing,
since women have little impact over society’s eroticization of women’s
subordination.88 In this case, how can women resist patriarchy from
within? How can they re-imagine gender roles in a way that is empowering
and can create change? Within this bind, however, Kennedy describes a
third possibility that emphasizes women’s agency within an unequal
society: “Women, who have no choice but to dress somehow within this
system of contending normativities, and their male and female audience,

84. Naomi Mezey, Legal Radicals in Madonna’s Closet: The Influence of Identity
Politics, Popular Culture, and a New Generation on Critical Legal Studies, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1835, 1850 (1994).
85. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990); DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY
DRESSING ETC. 127 (1993); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988);
Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995); Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female
Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 (1994); Laura T. Kessler, Is There Agency in
Dependency? Expanding the Feminist Justifications for Restructuring Wage Work, in
FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS 373-99 (Martha Albertson Fineman &
Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
86. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 69.
87. KENNEDY, supra note 85, at 127.
88. See id.
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act neither as mere tools of patriarchy nor as the autonomous subjects of
liberal theory.”89
Indeed, recent feminist critiques have resisted the modernist notion
that sexy dressing simply represents the end result of social patriarchy
and inequality.90 Feminist thinkers are increasingly exploring the ways
sexy dressing can be transformative, empowering, and a site of action
rather than simply a site of reaction. Patriarchal scripts and images may
be subverted through reinterpretation.91 In the context of the regulation
of sexuality at work, this may suggest the advantage of generating
alternative gender norms that reject the order in which management is so
invested.
IV. LIBERALISM IN PLAY: MACRO CONTRADICTIONS AND MICRO
VALUE JUDGMENTS IN ADJUDICATION
While Yuracko explores the ways perfectionist ideals creep into
adjudicative action in the context of Title VII claims, I suggest
antidiscrimination litigation should be understood as one among many
examples of an inevitable “liberalism-plus-perfectionism” impulse that
guides liberal judges. Because of pervasive tensions within liberal
commitments in action, judges regularly engage in value-driven
judgment in implementing the high orders of liberal rights in concrete
cases. Moreover, as we expand the inquiry of the internal incoherence in
liberal adjudication, we again encounter the ways in which Yuracko
overstates the internal coherence of alternative world views that may
explain judicial decisionmaking.
Because of the competing demands that liberal rights present in
concrete policy contexts, judges cannot remain neutral in evaluating
various human activities that are configured through law. One of the
primary functions of law is to stabilize expectations and increase
certainty. The idea that our current analytic frames are unsatisfactory for
line drawing in concrete cases is an uncomfortable one for many
thinkers. In former eras, legal formalism protected against the salience
of political choices that must be made in the application of rules to facts.
Today, scholars like Yuracko turn to ideals and principles beyond those
of liberalism to suggest more coherence in the adjudicative process.
Importantly, liberal theorists themselves often comprehend rights only
89. Id. at 128-29 (referring to this next step in feminist thinking as “pro-sex
feminist postmodernism”).
90. See, e.g., Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, supra note 85, at 339.
91. See Zipporah Wiseman et al., Is Subversion Subversive?, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 149 (2003).
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by reference to normative values, such as plurality, choice, autonomy,
and human flourishing.92
Turning to the perspective of historical labor market reforms reveals
that the creeping of perfectionist beliefs into a seemingly liberal legalistic
frame of individual freedoms is not unique to the context of sex
discrimination. Indeed, because of the conflicting values that liberalism
itself embodies, judges regularly refer to their beliefs of good life in
order to mediate these tensions. Here, I offer very briefly, and with a
very broad brush, some examples of these tensions. One example is the
way associational rights, freedom of speech, freedom of contract, and
property rights have played out in industrial relations and labor law.
Historically, the normative pull of a “right” and a “freedom” has been
used both by supporters of protective labor market policies and those
who resisted them. Courts have cited the constitutional freedoms of
association and speech both for the purpose of prohibiting and for
protecting labor organization.93 Judges have cited to the idea of freedom
of contract and property both to strike down protective employment
legislation and to create common law employment protections.94
Famously, in 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New York
law prohibiting bakers from working more than sixty hours per week.95
The Lochner court declared: “The right to purchase or to sell labor is
part of the liberty protected by [the Fourteenth] amendment, unless there
are circumstances which exclude the right.”96 Lochner was only one of
92. See generally Peter de Marneffe, Liberalism and Perfectionism, 43 AM. J.
JURIS. 99 (1998) (discussing “perfectionist liberalism”).
93. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding a law
prohibiting teachers belonging to certain associations unconstitutional); Dorchy v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926) (holding Kansas statute rendering it a crime to induce
another to commit a labor strike constitutional); Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated
Woodworkers’ Local Union No. 131, 75 N.E. 877, 879-81 (1905) (holding that workers
have a right to strike as their “fundamental” right to a “free and equal chance”). For
further discussion, see James Gray Pope, The First Amendment, the Thirteenth
Amendment, and the Right to Organize in the Twenty-First Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV.
941 (1999); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941,
996-1002 (1997).
94. It is instructive to compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905), and
the 1938 enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060.
See generally Davison M. Douglas, Contract Rights and Civil Rights, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1541 (2002) (book review); Risa Lauren Goluboff, “Let Economic Equality Take Care
of Itself”: The NAACP, Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1393 (2005).
95. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
96. Id. at 53.
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many decisions between 1905 and 1935 where contract and property
rights were used to justify striking down laws pertaining to worker
health and safety as well as collective bargaining and union membership.
Courts granted injunctions against labor strikes and struck down laws
making it a crime to fire an employee because of union membership,
grounding these decisions on liberal constitutional rights.97
The same ideas of liberties and rights served the New Deal
government in adopting a very different approach to market regulation.
At the same time the economy was experiencing upheaval and scarcities,
the idea that a “right” mandated particular distributional results was
increasingly destabilized. The legal realists showed how property rights
were in effect a bundle of relationships between differently situated
people with different interests, rather than a unified object.98 In 1935,
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted as a complete
reordering of work relations.99 During the same period, the Fair Labor
Standards Act was enacted, mandating a federal minimum wage and
overtime compensation even in the context of individual employment.
But the debates about what liberalism mandated in the context of work
relations remained ever controversial. For example, the NLRA, designed to
provide associational rights for workers seeking to unionize, also
protects the right of individual workers not to join unions.100 The
concept of a “right to work,” largely embraced in the international arena
97. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553-61 (1923) (employing
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to invalidate a minimum wage law for
women because it was not closely related to regulating the public interest, health, or
morals); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (using the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause to invalidate a law barring employers from forbidding their
employees to join unions); State v. Legendre, 70 So. 70, 71 (La. 1915) (invalidating a
limitation on firemen’s working hours under the Louisiana Constitution and the U.S.
Constitution). Moreover, from 1880 to 1930, state and federal courts issued roughly
4300 antistrike decrees. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 490 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
98. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in
the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV.
1141 (1938); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960 (1992); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights”
Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996).
99. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
157-69 (2000)).
100. “[T]he NLRA lent itself to conflicting policy aims; on the one hand, the ends
of wealth redistribution and increased consumer demand required worker solidarity,
while on the other hand, the goal of individual liberty respected the workers’ decision to
join a company union or no union.” Raymond L. Hogler, The Historical Misconception
of Right to Work Laws in the United States: Senator Robert Wagner, Legal Policy, and
the Decline of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101, 107 (2005).
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and numerous liberal constitutions as requiring a legal process to
promote the human capacity to act in the labor market, has been
interpreted in many American state laws as an anti-union law.101 By
1947, over a dozen states passed “right to work” laws, which outlawed
union security clauses and were designed to curtail the ability of unions
to expand membership through closed shop requirements for newly
hired workers.102 The fact that profoundly opposing political projects
appropriated the very same liberal discourse indicates some of the
complexities in adjudicating rights. In all of these contexts, because rights
in the abstract represent bundles of competing commitments and
protections, they cannot be applied without reference to “liberalism-plus”
or “plus-perfectionism” moral ordering. Without broader, richer visions
of social interactions and judgment about activities worth protecting,
judges have few independent variables on which they can rely when
adjudicating competing claims of individuals and groups.
Other, more micro examples of a judicial turn to normative evaluation
from the workplace context include the common law developed exceptions
to at-will employment. These exceptions range from tort exceptions of
public policy wrongful discharge, employee privacy rights, the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lastly, to the myriad of
antidiscrimination and identity accommodation policies which are the
focus of this symposium. Importantly, perfectionist hierarchies between
body and mind capacities are pervasive in employment law in general,
not simply in workplace discrimination law. An illuminating case is
Wilson v. Monarch, in which a sixty-year-old vice president, who was an
at-will employee, was demoted to an entry level warehouse supervisor
with “menial and demeaning duties, including sweeping up and cleaning
the warehouse cafeteria.”103 While the employer could have legally fired
the plaintiff, it was held liable for the demotion. The Fifth Circuit found
the employer’s conduct “so outrageous that civilized society should not
tolerate it.”104 Professor Alan Hyde contemplates some obvious questions
in reaction to this decision: “[W]ho swept up and cleaned the cafeteria
before Wilson? Was that intentional infliction of emotional distress?”105
101. See GILBERT GALL, THE POLITICS OF RIGHT TO WORK, 1943-1979, at 19 (1988).
102. See id. at 230-31.
103. STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 189 (2002) (citing Wilson v.
Monarch, 939 F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1991)).
104. Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1145.
105. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 103, at 189.

923

LOBEL.PRE_PDF_PAGES.DOC

2/26/2007 1:07:39 PM

The case law is saturated with examples where simple mistreatment is
not considered emotionally abusive and would not qualify for a tort
claim, like hiring a janitor to work in very difficult and unsafe conditions
with extremely low pay. Yet in Wilson, the move from white collar to
blue collar work was viewed by the court as demeaning and, thereby,
illegal.106 Regina Austin, writing about the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, invites us to imagine a different tort—a generic
tort of humiliation in work relations:
Whereas the law assumes that abuse is utilized because workers are not
contributing to the enterprise as they should be, workers view abuse as a
calculated devaluation of themselves and their work. . . . [Interviewed
employees] especially objected to being asked to do “menial” domestic chores
because it meant that their employers did not take them seriously with regard to
the tasks they were hired to perform.107

Austin’s imagined tort is clearly not recognized in modern
employment law. Rather, “[c]ourts see toughness and strength as such
positive attributes that they simply assume that the capacity to tolerate
abuse, and the propriety of dishing it out, vary with the nature of work,
the workplace, and the characteristics of the workers.”108 Moreover, the
conditions of acceptable hardship vary in adjudicative decisionmaking
along class and gender lines. According to Austin, “[m]ales and bluecollar workers, for example, may be subjected to harsher supervision
than females or white-collar workers because of the acceptability of sex
and class distinctions and the implications of group pride that underlie
the disparate treatment.”109 This “tolerated residuum”110 once again points
to the unstable interpretation of decency in employment relations as they
relate to our world views on human development and flourishing. In the
106. See Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1145. Another example involves the distinction
between “high culture” and “low culture” in freedom of speech jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J.
1935, 1979 (1995) (book review) (discussing author Cass R. Sunstein’s divide between
high culture, which supports democracy, and low culture, which erodes it). Yet another
example involves the ever shifting line between professional employees and nonprofessional employees for the purposes of employment and labor laws, such as the
FLSA and the NLRA. See generally John C. Duncan, Jr., The Indentured Servants of
Academia: The Adjunct Faculty Dilemma and Their Limited Legal Remedies, 74 IND.
L.J. 513 (1998); Allison E. McClure, Comment, The Professional Presumption: Do
Professional Employees Really Have Equal Bargaining Power When They Enter into
Employment-Related Adhesion Contracts?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1497 (2006); David M.
Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional
Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 (1990).
107. Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1988).
108. Id. at 18.
109. Id.
110. KENNEDY, supra note 85, at 137.

924

LOBEL.PRE_PDF_PAGES.DOC

2/26/2007 1:07:39 PM

A Response to Kim Yuracko

[VOL. 43: 899, 2006]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

end, the most interesting questions are about the particular constellations
resulting from the competing stances intertwined in the adjudicative
process.
Finally, in the field of antidiscrimination policies, it is important to
remember that Yuracko’s paper tackles aspects of the most conforming
standard within Title VII litigation—disparate treatment. As her paper
and our discussion here clarifies, the disparate treatment model itself as
developed in the case law cannot be explained solely by the liberal
principle of value neutral promotion of equality. Even more challenging
are those models that move beyond direct individual acts of discrimination
to the prohibition on disparately impacting work qualifications and
requirements of accommodation. None of these models fit neatly into the
gender-blind paradigm of sameness. In deciding the reasonableness of
accommodating disabilities or the relevance of certain job qualifications, for
example, pervasive indeterminacy of categories of sameness or difference
and freedom or coercion mandates the introduction of richer world
views. As discussed above, perfectionist ideals of human development
often assign privilege to emotional and intellectual endeavors over
physical or menial work. However, in some contexts, there is a flip. For
example, in the case of worker autonomy, privacy, and the establishment
of harassment claims, workers who experience a physical invasion are
much more likely to prevail in their claims than when the interference is
less tangible and the intrusion is non-physical. Thus, even perfectionism
gets turned on its head when it is called to service by practical dilemmas.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Yuracko’s paper tries to straddle inconsistencies in the
grand theory of liberalism by relying on a grand alternative theory of
perfectionism. This leaves unsatisfactory answers to profound
debates within liberalism and the legal system. Put crudely, Yuracko
offers too neat an explanation of too few questions about liberal theory
and adjudication. The last sections of Yuracko’s article are the most direct
retreat from the full conclusion to which her analysis should have led.
Reaching the end of her essay, Yuracko contends, “[c]ertainly most
antidiscrimination demands are consistent with standard liberal
principle. . . .”111 In conclusion, she stresses, “I have focused in this
paper on the areas of law in which standard equality and coworker
111.

Yuracko, supra note 1, at 896.
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arguments are at their most indeterminate and incoherent. “It is in these
areas that the role of perfectionism can be seen most clearly.”112 There
is no doubt that in some areas the existence of value-driven judgments is
more salient than in other areas. Yet the critical lesson from the exploration
of the recent antidiscrimination cases is that even in those areas that are
considered easy, distinctions are not fixed and conflicts do not result in a
stable resolution. Judicial understandings of the core liberal circle and
the outer circle of plus-perfectionism are constantly evolving.

112.
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